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Abstract
In many signal processing and machine learning applications, datasets
containing private information are held at different locations, requiring
the development of distributed privacy-preserving algorithms. Tensor and
matrix factorizations are key components of many processing pipelines.
In the distributed setting, differentially private algorithms suffer because
they introduce noise to guarantee privacy. This paper designs new and
improved distributed and differentially private algorithms for two popular
matrix and tensor factorization methods: principal component analysis
(PCA) and orthogonal tensor decomposition (OTD). The new algorithms
employ a correlated noise design scheme to alleviate the effects of noise and
can achieve the same noise level as the centralized scenario. Experiments
on synthetic and real data illustrate the regimes in which the correlated
noise allows performance matching with the centralized setting, outper-
forming previous methods and demonstrating that meaningful utility is
possible while guaranteeing differential privacy.
1 Introduction
Many signal processing and machine learning algorithms involve analyzing pri-
vate or sensitive data. The outcomes of such algorithms may potentially leak in-
formation about individuals present in the dataset. A strong and cryptographically-
motivated framework for protection against such information leaks is differential
privacy [1]. Differential privacy measures privacy risk in terms of the probability
of identifying individual data points in a dataset from the results of computa-
tions (algorithms) performed on that data.
In several modern applications the data is distributed over different loca-
tions or sites, with each site holding a smaller number of samples. For example,
consider neuro-imaging analyses for mental health disorders, in which there
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are many individual research groups, each with a modest number of subjects.
Learning meaningful population properties or efficient feature representations
from high-dimensional functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data re-
quires a large sample size. Pooling the data at a central location may enable
efficient feature learning, but privacy concerns and high communication over-
head often prevent sharing the underlying data. Therefore, it is desirable to have
efficient distributed algorithms that provide utility close to centralized case and
also preserve privacy [2].
This paper focuses on the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) or Princi-
pal Component Analysis (PCA), and orthogonal tensor decompositions. Despite
some limitations, PCA/SVD is one of the most widely-used preprocessing stages
in any machine learning algorithm: it projects data onto a lower dimensional
subspace spanned by the singular vectors of the second-moment matrix of the
data. Tensor decomposition is a powerful tool for inference algorithms because
it can be used to infer complex dependencies (higher order moments) beyond
second-moment methods such as PCA. This is particularly useful in latent vari-
able models [3] such as mixtures of Gaussians and topic modeling.
Related Works. For a complete introduction to the history of tensor de-
compositions, see the comprehensive survey of Kolda and Bader [4] (see also
Appendix B). The CANDECOMP/PARAFAC, or CP decomposition [5, 6] and
Tucker decomposition [7] are generalizations of the matrix SVD to multi-way
arrays. While finding the decomposition of arbitrary tensors is computationally
intractable, specially structured tensors appear in some latent variable models.
Such tensors can be decomposed efficiently [3, 4] using a variety of approaches
such as generalizations of the power iteration [8]. Exploiting such structures
in higher-order moments to estimate the parameters of latent variable models
has been studied extensively using the so-called orthogonal tensor decomposi-
tion (OTD) [3, 9–11]. To our knowledge, these decompositions have not been
studied in the setting of distributed data.
Several distributed PCA algorithms [12–17] have been proposed. Liang et
al. [12] proposed a distributed PCA scheme where it is necessary to send both
the left and right singular vectors along with corresponding singular values from
each site to the aggregator. Feldman et al. [18] proposed an improvement upon
this, where each site sends a D×R matrix to the aggregator. Balcan et al. [13]
proposed a further improved version using fast sparse subspace embedding [19]
and randomized SVD [20].
This paper proposes new privacy-preserving algorithms for distributed PCA
and OTD and builds upon our earlier work on distributed differentially private
eigenvector calculations [17] and centralized differentially private OTD [21]. It
improves on our preliminary works on distributed private PCA [17,22] in terms
of efficiency and fault-tolerance. Wang and Anandkumar [23] recently proposed
an algorithm for differentially private tensor decomposition using a noisy version
of the tensor power iteration [3, 8]. Their algorithm adds noise at each step of
the iteration and the noise variance grows with the predetermined number of
iterations. They also make the restrictive assumption that the input to their
algorithm is orthogonally decomposable. Our centralized OTD algorithms [21]
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Figure 1: The structure of the network: left – conventional, right – CAPE
avoid these assumptions and achieve better empirical performance (although
without theoretical guarantees). To our knowledge, this paper proposes the first
differentially private orthogonal tensor decomposition algorithm for distributed
settings.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose two new (, δ)-differentially
private algorithms, capePCA and capeAGN, for distributed differentially pri-
vate principal component analysis and orthogonal tensor decomposition, re-
spectively. The algorithms are inspired by the recently proposed correlation
assisted private estimation (CAPE) protocol [24] and input perturbation meth-
ods for differentially-private PCA [25, 26]. The CAPE protocol improves upon
conventional approaches, which suffer from excessive noise, at the expense of
requiring a trusted “helper” node that can generate correlated noise samples for
privacy. We extend the CAPE framework to handle site-dependent sample sizes
and privacy requirements. In capePCA, the sites share noisy second-moment
matrix estimates to a central aggregator, whereas in capeAGN the sites use a
distributed protocol to compute a projection subspace used to enable efficient
private OTD. This paper is about algorithms with provable privacy guarantees
and experimental validation. While asymptotic sample complexity guarantees
are of theoretical interest, proving performance bounds for distributed subspace
estimation is quite challenging. To validate our approach we show that our new
methods outperform previously proposed approaches, even under strong privacy
constraints. For weaker privacy requirements they can sometimes achieve the
same performance as a pooled-data scenario.
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2 Problems Using Distributed Private Data
Notation. We denote tensors with calligraphic scripts, e.g., X , vectors with
bold lower case letters, e.g., x, and matrices with bold upper case letters, e.g.
X. Scalars are denoted with regular letters, e.g., M . Indices are denoted with
lower case letters and they typically run from 1 to their upper-case versions,
e.g., m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . We sometimes denote the set {1, 2, . . . ,M} as [M ]. The
n-th column of the matrix X is denoted as xn. ‖ · ‖2 denotes the Euclidean
(or L2) norm of a vector and the spectral norm of a matrix. ‖ · ‖F denotes the
Frobenius norm and tr(·) denotes the trace operation.
Distributed Data Model. We assume that the data is distributed in S sites,
where each site s ∈ [S] has a data matrix Xs ∈ RD×Ns . The data samples in
the local sites are assumed to be disjoint. There is a central node that acts as
an aggregator (see Figure 1). We denote N =
∑S
s=1Ns as the total number
of samples over all sites. The data matrix Xs = [xs,1 . . . xs,Ns ] at site s is
considered to contain the D-dimensional features of Ns individuals. Without
loss of generality, we assume that ‖xs,n‖2 ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ [S] and ∀n ∈ [Ns]. If
we had all the data in the aggregator (pooled data scenario), then the data
matrix would be X = [X1 . . . XS ] ∈ RD×N . Our goal is to approximate the
performance of the pooled data scenario using distributed differentially private
algorithms.
Matrix and Tensor Factorizations. We first formulate the problem of dis-
tributed PCA. For simplicity, we assume that the observed samples are mean-
centered. The D×D sample second-moment matrix at site s is As = 1NsXsX>s .
In the pooled data scenario, the D × D positive semi-definite second-moment
matrix is A = 1NXX
>. According to the Schmidt approximation theorem [27],
the rank-K matrix AK that minimizes the difference ‖A−AK‖F can be found
by taking the SVD of A as A = VΛV>, where without loss of generality
we assume Λ is a diagonal matrix with entries {λd(A)} and λ1(A) ≥ . . . ≥
λD(A) ≥ 0. Additionally, V is a matrix of eigenvectors corresponding to the
eigenvalues. The top-K PCA subspace of A is the matrix VK(A) = [v1 . . .vK ].
Given VK(A) and the eigenvalue matrix Λ, we can form an approximation
AK = VK(A)ΛKVK(A)
> to A, where ΛK contains the K largest eigenval-
ues in Λ. For a D × K matrix Vˆ with orthonormal columns, the quality of
Vˆ in approximating VK(A) can be measured by the captured energy of A as
q(Vˆ) = tr(Vˆ>AVˆ). The Vˆ, which maximizes q(Vˆ) is the subspace VK(A).
We are interested in approximating VK(A) in a distributed setting while guar-
anteeing differential privacy.
Next, we describe the problem of orthogonal tensor decomposition (OTD).
As mentioned before, decomposition of arbitrary tensors is usually mathemat-
ically intractable. However, some specially structured tensors that appear in
several latent variable models can be efficiently decomposed [3] using a vari-
ety of approaches such as generalizations of the power iteration [8]. We review
some basic definitions related to tensor decomposition [4] in Appendix B. We
start with formulating the problem of orthogonal decomposition of symmetric
tensors and then continue on to distributed OTD. Due to page limitations, two
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examples of OTD from Anandkumar et al. [3], namely the single topic model
(STM) and the mixture of Gaussian (MOG), are presented in Appendix D.
Let X be an M -way D dimensional symmetric tensor. Given real valued
vectors vk ∈ RD, Comon et al. [28] showed that there exists a decomposition of
the form X = ∑Kk=1 λkvk ⊗ vk ⊗ · · · ⊗ vk, where ⊗ denotes the outer product.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that ‖vk‖2 = 1 ∀k. If we can find
a matrix V = [v1 . . .vK ] ∈ RD×K with orthogonal columns, then we say that
X has an orthogonal symmetric tensor decomposition [11]. Such tensors are
generated in several applications involving latent variable models. Recall that
if M ∈ RD×D is a symmetric rank-K matrix then we know that the SVD
of M is given by M = VΛV> =
∑K
k=1 λkvkv
>
k =
∑K
k=1 λkvk ⊗ vk, where
Λ = diag{λ1, λ2, . . . , λK} and vk is the k-th column of the orthogonal matrix V.
As mentioned before, the orthogonal decomposition of a 3-rd order symmetric
tensor X ∈ RD×D×D is a collection of orthonormal vectors {vk} together with
corresponding positive scalars {λk} such that X =
∑K
k=1 λkvk ⊗vk ⊗vk. Now,
in a setting where the data samples are distributed over different sites, we may
have local approximates Xs. We intend to use these local approximates from all
sites to find better and more accurate estimates of the {vk}, while preserving
privacy.
Differential Privacy. An algorithm A(D) taking values in a set T provides
(, δ)-differential privacy if
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ, (1)
for all measurable S ⊆ T and all data sets D and D′ differing in a single entry
(neighboring datasets). This definition essentially states that the probability
of the output of an algorithm is not changed significantly if the corresponding
database input is changed by just one entry. Here,  and δ are privacy param-
eters, where low  and δ ensure more privacy. Note that the parameter δ can
be interpreted as the probability that the algorithm fails. For more details, see
recent surveys [29] or the monograph of Dwork and Roth [30].
To illustrate, consider estimating the mean f(x) = 1N
∑N
n=1 xn of N scalars
x = [x1, . . . , xN−1, xN ]> with each xi ∈ [0, 1]. A neighboring data vec-
tor x′ = [x1, . . . , xN−1, x′N ]
>
differs in a single element. The sensitivity [1]
maxx |f(x)− f(x′)| of the function f(x) is 1N . Therefore, for (, δ) differentially-
private estimate of the average a = f(x), we can follow the Gaussian mecha-
nism [1] to release aˆ = a+ e, where e ∼ N (0, τ2) and τ = 1N√2 log 1.25δ .
Distributed Privacy-preserving Computation. In our distributed setting,
we assume that the sites are “honest but curious.” That is, the aggregator is
not trusted and the sites can collude to get a hold of some site’s data/function
output. Existing approaches to distributed differentially private algorithms can
introduce a significant amount of noise to guarantee privacy. Returning to the
example of mean estimation, suppose now there are S sites and each site s holds
a disjoint dataset xs of Ns samples for s ∈ [S]. A central aggregator wishes to
estimate and publish the mean of all the samples. The sites can send estimates
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to the aggregator but may collude to learn the data of other sites based on
the aggregator output. Without privacy, the sites can send as = f(xs) to the
aggregator and the average computed by aggregator (aag =
1
S
∑S
s=1 as) is ex-
actly equal to the average we would get if all the data samples were available
in the aggregator node. For preserving privacy, a standard differentially pri-
vate approach is for each site to send aˆs = f(xs) + es, where es ∼ N
(
0, τ2s
)
and τs =
1
Ns
√
2 log 1.25δ . The aggregator computes aag =
1
S
∑S
s=1 aˆs. We
observe aag =
1
S
∑S
s=1 aˆs =
1
S
∑S
s=1 as +
1
S
∑S
s=1 es: note that this estimate
is still noisy due to the privacy constraint. The variance of the estimator aag
is S · τ
2
s
S2
=
τ2s
S
, τ2ag. However, if we had all the data samples in the cen-
tral aggregator, then we could compute the differentially-private average as
ac =
1
N
∑N
n=1 xn + ec, where ec ∼ N
(
0, τ2c
)
and τc =
1
N
√
2 log 1.25δ . If we
assume that each site has equal number of samples then N = SNs and we have
τc =
1
SNs
√
2 log 1.25δ =
τs
S
. We observe the ratio
τ2c
τ2ag
=
τ2s / S
2
τ2s / S
= 1S , show-
ing that the conventional differentially-private distributed averaging scheme is
always worse than the differentially-private pooled data case.
3 Correlated Noise Scheme
The recently proposed Correlation Assisted Private Estimation (CAPE) [24]
scheme exploits the network structure and uses a correlated noise design to
achieve the same performance of the pooled data case (i.e., τag = τc) in the
decentralized setting. We assume there is a trusted noise generator in addition
to the central aggregator (see Figure 1). The local sites and the central ag-
gregator can also generate noise. The noise generator and the aggregator can
send noise to the sites through secure (encrypted) channels. The noise addition
procedure is carefully designed to ensure the privacy of the algorithm output
from each site and to achieve the noise level of the pooled data scenario in
the final output from the central aggregator. Considering the same distributed
averaging problem as in Section 2, the noise generator and central aggregator
respectively send es and fs to each site s. Site s generates noise gs and re-
leases/sends aˆs = f(xs) + es + fs + gs. The noise generator generates es such
that
∑S
s=1 es = 0. As shown in [24], these noise terms are distributed according
to es ∼ N (0, τ2e ), fs ∼ N (0, τ2f ), and gs ∼ N (0, τ2g ), where
τ2e = τ
2
f =
(
1− 1
S
)
τ2s , and τ
2
g =
τ2s
S
. (2)
The aggregator computes aimpag =
1
S
∑S
s=1 (aˆs − fs) = 1N
∑N
n=1 xn +
1
S
∑S
s=1 gs,
where we used
∑
s es = 0 and the fact that the aggregator knows the fs, so it
can subtract all of those from aˆs. The variance of the estimator a
imp
ag is S · τ
2
g
S2 =
τ2s
S2 = τ
2
c , which is the same as if all the data were present at the aggregator. This
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claim is formalized in Lemma 1. We show the complete algorithm in Algorithm
3 (Appendix A.1). Privacy follows from previous work [24], and if S > 2 and
number of trusted sites (the sites that would not collude with any adversary)
Str ≥ 2, the aggregator does not need to generate fs.
Proposition 1. (Performance gain [24]) Consider the gain function G(n) =
τ2ag
τ impag
2 =
N2
S2
∑S
s=1
1
N2s
with n = [N1, . . . , NS ]. Then:
• the minimum G(n) is S and is achieved when n = [NS , . . . , NS ]
• the maximum G(n) is N2S2
(
1
(N−S+1)2 + S − 1
)
, which occurs when n =
[1, . . . , 1, N − S + 1]
Proof. The proof is a consequence of Schur convexity and is given in [24].
3.1 Extension of CAPE to Unequal Privacy Requirements
We now propose a generalization of the CAPE scheme, which applies to scenarios
where different sites have different privacy requirements and/or sample sizes.
Additionally, sites may have different “quality notions”, i.e., while combining
the site outputs at the aggregator, the aggregator can decide to use different
weights to different sites (possibly according to the quality of the output from
a site). Let us assume that site s requires (s, δs)-differential privacy guarantee
for its output. According to the Gaussian mechanism [1], the noise to be added
to the (non-private) output of site s should have standard deviation given by
τs =
1
Nss
√
2 log 1.25δs . We need that site s outputs aˆs = f(xs)+es+fs+gs. Here,
gs ∼ N (0, τ2gs) is generated locally, es ∼ N (0, τ2es) is generated from the random
noise generator, and fs ∼ N (0, τ2fs) is generated in the central aggregator. We
need to satisfy
τ2fs+gs = τ
2
fs + τ
2
gs ≥ τ2s , and τ2es+gs = τ2es + τ2gs ≥ τ2s .
As mentioned before, the aggregator can decide to compute a weighted av-
erage with weights selected according to some quality measure of the site’s
data/output (e.g., if the aggregator knows that a particular site is suffering
from more noisy observations than other sites, it can choose to give the out-
put from that site less weight while combining the site results). Let us denote
the weights by {µs} such that
∑S
s=1 µs = 1 and µs ≥ 0. Note that, our pro-
posed generalized CAPE reduces to the existing [24] CAPE for µs =
Ns
N . The
aggregator computes
aimpag =
S∑
s=1
µs (aˆs − fs) =
S∑
s=1
µsas +
S∑
s=1
µses +
S∑
s=1
µsgs.
In accordance with our goal of achieving the same level of noise as the pooled
data scenario, we need var
[∑S
s=1 µsgs
]
= τ2c =⇒
∑S
s=1 µ
2
sτ
2
gs = τ
2
c . Addi-
tionally, we need
∑S
s=1 µses = 0. With these constraints, we can formulate a
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feasibility problem to solve for the unknown noise variances {τ2es, τ2gs, τ2fs} as
minimize 0
subject to τ2fs + τ
2
gs ≥ τ2s , τ2es + τ2gs ≥ τ2s ,
S∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
gs = τ
2
c ,
S∑
s=1
µses = 0,
for all s ∈ [S], where {µs}, τc and τs are known to the aggregator. For this
problem, multiple solutions are possible. We present one solution here that
solves the problem with equality. For the S-th site:
τ2eS = τ
2
fS =
τ2S
2
− 1
2µ2S
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)
τ2gS =
τ2S
2
+
1
2µ2S
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)
.
For other sites s ∈ [S − 1]:
τ2es = τ
2
fs =
1
µ2s(S − 1)
[
µ2S
2
τ2S −
1
2
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)]
τ2gs = τ
2
s −
1
µ2s(S − 1)
[
µ2S
2
τ2S −
1
2
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)]
.
The derivation of this solution is shown in Appendix A.2.
4 Improved Distributed Differentially-private Prin-
cipal Component Analysis
In this section, we propose an improved distributed differentially-private PCA
algorithm that takes advantage of the CAPE protocol. Recall that in our dis-
tributed PCA problem, we are interested in approximating VK(A) in a dis-
tributed setting while guaranteeing differential privacy. One na¨ıve approach
(non-private) would be to send the data matrices from the sites to the aggrega-
tor. When D and/or Ns are large, this entails a huge communication overhead.
In many scenarios the local data are also private or sensitive. As the aggregator
is not trusted, sending the data to the aggregator can result in a significant
privacy violation. Our goals are therefore to reduce the communication cost,
ensure differential privacy, and provide a close approximation to the true PCA
subspace VK(A). We previously proposed a differentially-private distributed
PCA scheme [17], but the performance of the scheme is limited by the larger
variance of the additive noise at the local sites due to the smaller sample sizes.
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Algorithm 1 Improved Distributed Differentially-private PCA (capePCA)
Require: Data matrix Xs ∈ RD×Ns for s ∈ [S]; privacy parameters , δ;
reduced dimension K
1: At random noise generator: generate Es ∈ RD×D, as described in the text;
send to sites
2: At aggregator: generate Fs ∈ RD×D, as described in the text; send to sites
3: for s = 1, 2, . . . , S do . at the local sites
4: Compute As ← 1NsXsX>s
5: Generate D ×D symmetric matrix Gs, as described in the text
6: Compute Aˆs ← As + Es + Fs + Gs; send Aˆs to aggregator
7: end for
8: Compute Aˆ← 1S
∑S
s=1
(
Aˆs − Fs
)
. at the aggregator
9: Perform SVD: Aˆ = VΛV>
10: Release / send to sites: VK
11: return VK
We intend to alleviate this problem using the correlated noise scheme [24]. The
improved distributed differentially-private PCA algorithm (capePCA) we pro-
pose here achieves the same utility as the pooled data scenario.
We consider the same network structure as in Section 3: there is a ran-
dom noise generator that can generate and send noise to the sites through an
encrypted/secure channel. The aggregator can also generate noise and send
those to the sites over encrypted/secure channels. Recall that in the pooled
data scenario, we have the data matrix X and the sample second-moment
matrix A = 1NXX
>. We refer to the top-K PCA subspace of this sample
second-moment matrix as the true (or optimal) subspace VK(A). At each
site, we compute the sample second-moment matrix as As =
1
Ns
XsX
>
s . The
L2 sensitivity [1] of the function f(Xs) = As is ∆s2 = 1Ns [26]. In order to
approximate As satisfying (, δ) differential privacy, we can employ the AG al-
gorithm [26] to compute Aˆs = As + Gs, where the symmetric matrix Gs is
generated with entries i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ2s ) and τs = ∆
s
2

√
2 log 1.25δ . Note that,
in the pooled data scenario, the L2 sensitivity of the function f(X) = A is
∆pool2 =
1
N . Therefore, the required additive noise standard deviation should
satisfy τpool =
∆pool2

√
2 log 1.25δ =
τs
S , assuming equal number of samples in the
sites. As we want the same utility as the pooled data scenario, we compute the
following at each site s:
Aˆs = As + Es + Fs + Gs.
Here, the noise generator generates the D × D matrix Es with [Es]ij drawn
i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ2e ) and
∑S
s=1 Es = 0. We set the variance τ
2
e according to (2)
as τ2e =
(
1− 1S
)
τ2s . Additionally, the aggregator generates the D × D matrix
Fs with [Fs]ij drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ2f ). The variance τ2f is set according to
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(2) as τ2f =
(
1− 1S
)
τ2s . Finally, the sites generate their own symmetric D ×D
matrix Gs, where [Gs]ij are drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ2g ) and τ2g = 1S τ2s according
to (2). Note that, these variance assignments can be readily modified to fit the
unequal privacy/sample size scenario (Section 3.1). However, for simplicity, we
are considering the equal sample size scenario. Now, the sites send their Aˆs to
the aggregator and the aggregator computes
Aˆ =
1
S
S∑
s=1
(
Aˆs − Fs
)
=
1
S
S∑
s=1
(As + Gs) ,
where we used the relation
∑S
s=1 Es = 0. The detailed calculation is shown in
Appendix C.1. We note that at the aggregator, we end up with an estimator
with noise variance exactly the same as that of the pooled data scenario. Next,
we perform SVD on Aˆ and release the top-K eigenvector matrix VK , which is
the (, δ) differentially private approximate to the true subspace VK(A). To
achieve the same utility level as the pooled data case, we chose to send the full
matrix Aˆs from the sites to the aggregator instead of the partial square root of
it [17]. This increases the communication cost by SD(D − R), where R is the
intermediate dimension of the partial square root. This can be thought of as
the cost of gain in performance.
Theorem 1 (Privacy of capePCA Algorithm). Algorithm 1 computes an (, δ)
differentially private approximation to the optimal subspace VK(A).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 follows from using the Gaussian mechanism [1],
the AG algorithm [26], the bound on ‖As −A′s‖2 and recalling that the data
samples in each site are disjoint. We start by showing that
τ2e + τ
2
g = τ
2
g + τ
2
f = τ
2
s =
(
1
Ns
√
2 log
1.25
δ
)2
.
Therefore, the computation of Aˆs at each site is at least (, δ) differentially-
private. As differential privacy is invariant under post-processing, we can com-
bine the noisy second-moment matrices Aˆs at the aggregator while subtracting
Fs for each site. By the correlated noise generation at the random noise gen-
erator, the noise Es cancels out. We perform the SVD on Aˆ and release VK .
The released subspace VK is thus the (, δ) differentially private approximate
to the true subspace VK(A).
Performance Gain with Correlated Noise. The distributed differentially-
private PCA algorithm of [17] essentially employs the conventional averaging
(when each site sends the full Aˆs to the aggregator). Therefore, the gain in
performance of the proposed capePCA algorithm over the one in [17] is the
same as shown in Proposition 1.
Theoretical Performance Guarantee. Due to the application of the corre-
lated noise protocol, we achieve the same level of noise at the aggregator in the
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distributed setting as we would have in the pooled data scenario. In essence,
the proposed capePCA algorithm can achieve the same performance as the AG
algorithm [26] modified to account for all the samples across all the sites. Here,
we present three guarantees for the captured energy, closeness to the true sub-
space and low-rank approximation. The guarantees are adopted from Dwork
et al. [26] and modified to fit our setup and notation. Let us assume that
the (, δ) differentially-private subspace output from Algorithm 1 and the true
subspace are denoted by VˆK and VK , respectively. We denote the singular
values of X with σ1 ≥ . . . ≥ σD and the un-normalized second-moment matrix
with A = XX>. Let AK and AˆK be the true and the (, δ) differentially-
private rank-K approximates to A, respectively. If we assume that the gap
σ2K − σ2K+1 = ω(τpool
√
D), then the following holds
• tr
(
Vˆ>KAVˆK
)
≥ tr (V>KAVK)−O(τpoolK√D)
•
∥∥∥VKV>K − VˆKVˆ>K∥∥∥
2
= O
(
τpool
√
D
σ2K−σ2K+1
)
• ‖A− AˆK‖2 ≤ ‖A−AK‖2 +O(τpool
√
D).
The detailed proofs can be found in Dwork et al. [26].
Communication Cost. We quantify the total communication cost associated
with the proposed capePCA algorithm. Recall that capePCA is an one-shot
algorithm. Each of the random noise generator and the aggregator send one
D×D matrix to the sites. Each site uses these to compute the noisy estimate of
the local second-moment matrix (D×D) and sends that back to the aggregator.
Therefore, the total communication cost is proportional to 3SD2 or O(D2). This
is expected as we are computing the global D ×D second-moment matrix in a
distributed setting before computing the PCA subspace.
5 Distributed Differentially-private Orthogonal
Tensor Decomposition
In this section, we propose an algorithm (capeAGN) for distributed differentially-
private OTD. The proposed algorithm takes advantage of the correlated noise
design scheme (Algorithm 3) [24]. To our knowledge, this is the first work
on distributed differentially-private OTD. Due to page limits, the definition
of the differentially-private OTD and the description of two recently proposed
differentially-private OTD algorithms [21] are presented in Appendix E.
We start with recalling that the orthogonal decomposition of a 3-rd order
symmetric tensor X ∈ RD×D×D is a collection of orthonormal vectors {vk}
together with corresponding positive scalars {λk} such that X =
∑K
k=1 λkvk ⊗
vk ⊗ vk. A unit vector u ∈ RD is an eigenvector of X with corresponding
eigenvalue λ if X (I,u,u) = λu, where I is the D ×D identity matrix [3]. To
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Algorithm 2 Distributed Differentially-private OTD (capeAGN)
Require: Sample second-order moment matrices Ms2 ∈ RD×D and third-order
moment tensors Ms3 ∈ RD×D×D ∀s ∈ [S], privacy parameters 1, 2, δ1, δ2,
reduced dimension K
1: At random noise generator: generate Es2 ∈ RD×D and Es3 ∈ RD×D×D, as
described in the text; send to sites
2: At aggregator: generate Fs2 ∈ RD×D and Fs3 ∈ RD×D×D, as described in
the text; send to sites
3: for s = 1, . . . , S do . at the local sites
4: Generate Gs2 ∈ RD×D, as described in the text
5: Compute Mˆs2 ←Ms2 + Es2 + Fs2 + Gs2; send Mˆs2 to aggregator
6: end for
7: Compute Mˆ2 ← 1S
∑S
s=1
(
Mˆs2 − Fs2
)
and then SVD(K) of Mˆ2 as Mˆ2 =
UDU> . at the aggregator
8: Compute and send to sites: W← UD− 12
9: for s = 1, . . . , S do . at the local sites
10: Generate symmetric Gs3 ∈ RD×D×D from the entries of b ∈ RDsym , where
[b]d ∼ N (0, τ23g) and τ23g = 1S τs3 2
11: Compute Mˆs3 ←Ms3 + Es3 +Fs3 + Gs3 and M˜s3 ← Mˆs3 (W,W,W); send
M˜s3 to aggregator
12: end for
13: Compute M˜3 ← 1S
∑S
s=1
(
M˜s3 −Fs3 (W,W,W)
)
. at the aggregator
14: return The differentially private orthogonally decomposable tensor M˜3,
projection subspace W
see this, one can observe
X (I,u,u) =
K∑
k=1
λk
(
I>vk
)⊗ (u>vk)⊗ (u>vk)
=
K∑
k=1
λk
(
u>vk
)2
vk.
By the orthogonality of the vk, it is clear that X (I,vk,vk) = λkvk ∀k. Now,
the orthogonal tensor decomposition proposed in [3] is based on the mapping
u 7→ X (I,u,u)‖X (I,u,u)‖2 , (3)
which can be considered as the tensor equivalent of the well-known matrix power
method. Obviously, all tensors are not orthogonally decomposable. As the
tensor power method requires the eigenvectors {vk} to be orthonormal, we need
to perform whitening - that is, projecting the tensor on a subspace such that
the eigenvectors become orthogonal to each other.
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We note that the proposed algorithm applies to both of the STM and MOG
problems. However, as the correlated noise scheme only works with Gaussian
noise, the proposed capeAGN employs the AGN algorithm [21] at its core. In-line
with our setup in Section 3, we assume that there is a random noise genera-
tor that can generate and send noise to the sites through an encrypted/secure
channel. The un-trusted aggregator can also generate noise and send those to
the sites over encrypted/secure channels. At site s, the sample second-order
moment matrix and the third-order moment tensor are denoted as Ms2 ∈ RD×D
and Ms3 ∈ RD×D×D, respectively. The noise standard deviation required for
computing the (1, δ1) differentially-private approximate to M
s
2 is given by
τs2 =
∆s2
1
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ1
)
, (4)
where the sensitivity ∆s2 is inversely proportional to the sample size Ns. To be
more specific, we can write ∆s2,S =
√
2
Ns
and ∆s2,M =
1
Ns
. The detailed derivation
of the sensitivity of Ms2 for both STM and MOG are shown in Appendix E.
Additionally, at site s, the noise standard deviation required for computing the
(2, δ2) differentially-private approximate to Ms3 is given by
τs3 =
∆s3
2
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ2
)
. (5)
Again, we can write ∆s3,S =
√
2
Ns
and ∆s3,M =
2
Ns
+ 6Dσ
2
Ns
. Appendix E contains
the detailed algebra for calculating the sensitivity of Ms3 for STM and MOG.
We note that, as in the case of Ms2, the sensitivity depends only on the sample
size Ns. Now, in the pooled-data scenario, the noise standard deviations would
be given by:
τpool2 =
∆pool2
1
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ1
)
τpool3 =
∆pool3
2
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ2
)
,
where ∆pool2 =
∆s2
S and ∆
pool
3 =
∆s3
S , assuming equal number of samples in the
sites. We need to compute the D×K whitening matrix W and the D×D×D
tensor Mˆ3 in a distributed way while satisfying differential privacy. Although
we could employ our previous centralized differentially-private distributed PCA
algorithm [17] to compute W, to achieve the same level of accuracy as the
pooled data scenario, we compute the following matrix at site s:
Mˆs2 = M
s
2 + E
s
2 + F
s
2 + G
s
2,
where Es2 ∈ RD×D is generated at the noise generator satisfying
∑S
s=1 E
s
2 = 0
and the entries [Es2]ij drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ22e). Here, we set the noise variance
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according to (2): τ22e =
(
1− 1S
)
τs2
2. Additionally, Fs2 ∈ RD×D is generated
at the aggregator with the entries [Fs2]ij drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ22f ). We set the
noise variance according to (2): τ22f =
(
1− 1S
)
τs2
2. Finally, Gs2 ∈ RD×D is a
symmetric matrix generated at site s where {[Gs2]ij : i ∈ [D], j ≤ i} are drawn
i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ22g), [Gs2]ij = [Gs2]ji and τ22g = 1S τs2 2. At the aggregator, we
compute
Mˆ2 =
1
S
S∑
s=1
(
Mˆs2 − Fs2
)
=
1
S
S∑
s=1
(Ms2 + G
s
2) ,
where we used the relation
∑S
s=1 E
s
2 = 0. Note that the variance of the additive
noise in Mˆ2 is exactly the same as the pooled data scenario, as described in
Section 3. At the aggregator, we can then compute the SVD(K) of Mˆ2 as
Mˆ2 = UDU
>. We compute the matrix W = UD−
1
2 and send it to the sites.
Next, we focus on computing Mˆ3 in the distributed setting. For this pur-
pose, we can follow the same steps as computing Mˆ2. However, Mˆ3 is a
D × D × D tensor, and for large enough D, this will entail a very large com-
munication overhead. We alleviate this in the following way: each site receives
Fs3 ∈ RD×D×D and W from the aggregator and Es3 ∈ RD×D×D from the noise
generator. Here, [Fs3 ]ijk are drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ23f ). Additionally, [Es3 ]ijk are
drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ23e) and
∑S
s=1 Es3 = 0 is satisfied. We set the two variance
terms according to (2): τ23f = τ
s
3e =
(
1− 1S
)
τs3
2. Finally, each site generates
their own Gs3 ∈ RD×D×D in the following way: site s draws a vector b ∈ RDsym
with Dsym =
(
D+2
3
)
and entries i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ23g), where τ23g = 1S τs3 2. The ten-
sor Gs3 is generated with the entries from b such that Gs3 is symmetric. Again,
for both Mˆs2 and Mˆs3, we are considering the equal sample size scenario for
simplicity. Our framework requires only a small modification to incorporate the
unequal privacy/sample size scenario (Section 3.1). Now, each site s computes
Mˆs3 =Ms3 + Es3 + Fs3 + Gs3 and M˜s3 = Mˆs3 (W,W,W) .
We note that M˜s3 is a K×K×K dimensional tensor. Each site sends this to the
aggregator. This saves a lot of communication overhead as typically K  D.
To see how this would result in the same estimate of M˜3 as the pooled data
scenario, we observe
M˜s3 = Mˆs3 (W,W,W) =Ms3 (W,W,W) +
Es3 (W,W,W) + Fs3 (W,W,W) + Gs3 (W,W,W) .
Additionally, at the aggregator, we compute
M˜3 = 1
S
S∑
s=1
(
M˜s3 − F˜s3
)
=
(
1
S
S∑
s=1
Ms3 + Gs3
)
(W,W,W) ,
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where F˜s3 = Fs3 (W,W,W). We used the associativity of the multi-linear
operation [3] and the relation
∑S
s=1 Es3 = 0. The detailed calculation is shown
in Appendix C.2. Note that the M˜3 we achieve in this scheme is exactly the
same M˜3 we would have achieved if all the data samples were present in the
aggregator. Moreover, this is also the quantity that the aggregator would get
if the sites send the full Mˆs3 to the aggregator instead of M˜s3. The complete
capeAGN algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 2 (Privacy of capeAGN Algorithm). Algorithm 2 computes an (1 +
2, δ1 + δ2) differentially private orthogonally decomposable tensor M˜3. Addi-
tionally, the computation of the projection subspace W is (1, δ1) differentially
private.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 follows from using the Gaussian mechanism [1],
the sensitivities of Ms2 and Ms3 and recalling that the data samples in each
site are disjoint. First, we show that the computation of W satisfies (1, δ1)
differential privacy. Due to the nature of the correlated noise design, we have
τ22e + τ
2
2g = τ
2
2g + τ
2
2f = τ
s
2
2 =
(
∆s2
1
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ1
))2
,
where ∆s2 is the sensitivity of M
s
2. Therefore, the release of Mˆ
s
2 from each site
s is at least (1, δ1) differentially-private. As differential privacy is closed under
post-processing and the samples in each site are disjoint, the computation of W
at the aggregator also satisfies (1, δ1) differential privacy. Next, we show that
the computation of M˜3 satisfies (1 + 2, δ1 + δ2) differential privacy. We recall
that
τ23e + τ
2
3g = τ
2
3g + τ
2
3f = τ
s
3
2 =
(
∆s3
2
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ2
))2
,
where ∆s3 is the sensitivity of Ms3. The computation of Mˆs3 at each site is at
least (2, δ2) differentially-private. Further, by the composition theorem [1], the
computation M˜s3 = Mˆs3 (W,W,W) at each site is (1+2, δ1+δ2) differentially-
private. By the post-processing invariability, the computation of M˜3 at the
aggregator is (1 + 2, δ1 + δ2) differentially-private.
Performance Gain with Correlated Noise. As we mentioned before, this
is the first work that proposes an algorithm for distributed differentially-private
OTD. As we employ the CAPE scheme for our computations, the gain in the
performance over a conventional distributed differentially-private OTD is there-
fore the same as in the case of distributed differentially-private averaging, as
described in Proposition 1.
Theoretical Performance Guarantee. Although our proposed capeAGN al-
gorithm can reach the performance of the pooled data scenario (that is, the
AGN algorithm with all data samples from all sites stored in the aggregator), it
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is hard to characterize how the estimated {aˆk} and {wˆk} would deviate from
the true {ak} and {wk}, respectively. We note that although we are adding
symmetric noise to the third-order moment tensor, an orthogonal decomposi-
tion need not exist for the perturbed tensor, even though the perturbed tensor
is symmetric [3, 11]. Anandkumar et al. [3] provided a bound on the error of
the recovered decomposition in terms of the operator norm of the tensor per-
turbation. For our proposed algorithm, the perturbation includes the effect of
estimating the third-order moment tensor from the samples as well as the noise
added for differential-privacy. Even without accounting for the error in estimat-
ing the moments from observable samples, the operator norm of the effective
noise at the aggregator: ‖G‖op = 1S
∥∥∥∑Ss=1 Gs3∥∥∥
op
, is a random quantity, and
requires new measure concentration results to analyze. Relating these bounds
to the error in estimating recovering the {ak} and {wk} is nontrivial and we
defer this for future work.
Communication Cost. We note that capeAGN is a two-step algorithm: it
computes the projection subspace W ∈ RD×K and then orthogonally decom-
posable tensor M˜3. The random noise generator sends Es2 ∈ RD×D and Es3 ∈
RD×D×D to each site s. Each site s sends Mˆs2 ∈ RD×D and M˜s3 ∈ RK×K×K
and to the aggregator. The aggregator sends Fs2 ∈ RD×D, W ∈ RD×K , and
Fs3 ∈ RD×D×D to each site s. Therefore, the total communication cost is pro-
portional to 3SD2 + 2SD3 +SDK+SK3 or O(D3). This is expected as we are
computing the global D × D × D third-order moment tensor in a distributed
setting.
6 Experimental Results
In this section, we empirically show the effectiveness of the proposed distributed
differentially-private matrix and tensor factorization algorithms. We focus on
investigating the privacy-utility trade-off: how the performance varies as a func-
tion of the privacy parameters and the number of samples. We start with the
the proposed capePCA algorithm followed by the capeAGN algorithm. In each
case, we compare the proposed algorithms with existing (if any) algorithm, non-
private algorithm and a conventional approach (no correlated noise).
6.1 Improved Distributed Differentially-private PCA
We empirically compared the proposed capePCA, the existing DPdisPCA and
non-private PCA on pooled data (non− dp pool). We also included the per-
formance of differentially private PCA [26] on local data (local) (i.e. data of
a single site) and the conventional approach (conv) (i.e. without correlated
noise). We designed the experiments according to Imtiaz and Sarwate [17] us-
ing three datasets: a synthetic dataset (D = 200, K = 50) generated with zero
mean and a pre-determined covariance matrix, the MNIST dataset (D = 784,
K = 50) [31] (MNIST) and the Covertype dataset (D = 54, K = 10) [32]
(COVTYPE). The MNIST consists of handwritten digits and has a training set
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Figure 2: Variation of performance in distributed PCA for synthetic and real
data: (a) - (c) with privacy parameter ; (d) - (f) with sample size Ns and (g)
- (i) with privacy parameter δ
of 60000 samples, each of size 28×28 pixels. The COVTYPE contains the forest
cover types for 30 × 30 m2 cells obtained from US Forest Service (USFS) Re-
gion 2 Resource Information System (RIS) data. We collected the dataset from
the UC Irvine KDD archive [32]. For our experiments, we randomly selected
60000 samples from the COVTYPE. We preprocessed the data by subtracting
the mean (centering) and normalizing the samples with the maximum L2 norm
in each dataset to enforce the condition ‖xn‖2 ≤ 1 ∀n. We note that this
preprocessing step is not differentially private, although it can be modified to
satisfy differential-privacy at the cost of some utility. In all cases we show the
average performance over 10 runs of the algorithms. As a performance measure
of the produced subspace from the algorithm, we choose the captured energy:
qCE = tr(Vˆ>AVˆ), where Vˆ is the subspace estimated by an algorithm and A
is the true second-moment matrix of the data. Note that, we can approximate
the the captured energy in the true subspace as tr(VK(A)
>AVK(A)), where
A is achieved from the pooled-data sample second-moment matrix and VK(A)
is achieved from the non-private PCA.
Dependence on privacy parameter . First, we explore the trade-off be-
tween privacy and utility; i.e., between  and qCE. We note that the standard
deviation of the added noise is inversely proportional to  – bigger  means
higher privacy risk but less noise and thus, better utility. In Figure 2(a)-(c), we
show the variation of qCE of different algorithms for different values of . For
this experiment, we kept the parameters δ, Ns and S fixed. For all the datasets,
we observe that as  increases (higher privacy risk), the captured energy in-
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creases. The proposed capePCA reaches the optimal utility for some parameter
choices and clearly outperforms the existing DPdisPCA, the conv, and the local
algorithms. One of the reasons that capePCA outperforms conv is the smaller
noise variance at the aggregator, as described before. Moreover, capePCA out-
performs DPdisPCA because DPdisPCA suffers from a larger variance at the
aggregator due to computation of the partial square root of Aˆs [17]. However,
it should be noted here that DPdisPCA offers a much smaller communication
overhead than capePCA. Achieving better performance than local is intuitive
because including the information from multiple sites to estimate a population
parameter should always result in better performance than using the data from
a single site only. An interesting observation is that for datasets with lower
dimensional samples, we can use smaller  (i.e., to guarantee lower privacy risk)
for the same utility.
Dependence on number of samples Ns. Next, we investigate the variation
in performance with sample size Ns. Intuitively, it should be easier to guarantee
smaller privacy risk  and higher utility qCE, when the number of samples is
large. Figures 2(d)-(f) show how qCE increases as a function of sample size per
site Ns. The variation with Ns reinforces the results seen earlier with variation
of . For a fixed  and δ, the utility increases as we increase Ns. For sufficiently
large local sample size, the captured energy will reach that of non− dp pool.
Again, we observe a sharper increase in utility for lower-dimensional dataset.
Dependence on privacy parameter δ. Finally, we explore the variation of
performance with the other privacy parameter δ. Recall that δ can be con-
sidered as the probability that the algorithm releases the private information
without guaranteeing privacy. We, therefore, want this to be as small as pos-
sible. However, lower δ results in larger noise variance. In Figure 2(g)-(i), we
show how qCE vary with varying δ. We observe that if δ is not too small, the
proposed algorithm can achieve very good utility, easily outperforming the other
algorithms.
6.2 Distributed Differentially-private OTD
For the proposed capeAGN algorithm, we focus on measuring how well the out-
put of the proposed algorithm approximate the true components {ak} and {wk}.
Let the recovered component vectors be {aˆk}. We use an error metric [21] qcomp,
to capture the disparity between {ak} and {aˆk}. For the k-th recovered com-
ponent vector aˆk, we compute the Euclidean distance from it to all of the true
component vectors {ak} and find the one with the minimum Euclidean distance.
This distance is the score for the k-th recovered component. We take the average
of all scores to get qcomp:
qcomp =
1
K
K∑
k=1
EDkmin, where ED
k
min = min
k′∈[K]
‖aˆk − ak′‖2.
A similar measure is used in dictionary learning to verify the correctness of the
recovered dictionary atoms [33]. In order for the comparison, we show the er-
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Figure 3: Variation of performance in the MOG setup: top-row – with privacy
parameter ; bottom-row – with sample size Ns
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Figure 4: Variation of performance in the STM setup: top-row – with privacy
parameter ; bottom-row – with sample size Ns
ror resulting from the aˆk’s achieved from the proposed capeAGN algorithm, a
conventional (but never proposed anywhere to the best of our knowledge) dis-
tributed differentially-private OTD algorithm that does not employ correlated
noise (conv), a differentially-private OTD [21] on local data (local) and the non-
private tensor power method [3] on pooled data (Non− priv.). We also show the
error considering random vectors as aˆk’s (Rand. vect.). The reason [21] behind
showing errors pertaining to random vectors is the following: this error corre-
sponds to the worst possible results, as we are not taking any information from
data into account to estimate aˆk’s. We note that, as recovering the compo-
nent vectors is closely related with recovering the selection probabilities {wk},
we only show the error associated with recovering the component vectors. We
studied the dependence of qcomp on the privacy parameters , δ and the sample
size Ns. In all cases we show the average performance over 10 runs of each
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Figure 5: Variation of performance with privacy parameter δ: top-row – in
MOG setup; bottom-row – in STM setup
algorithm. We note that the capeAGN algorithm adds noise in two stages for
ensuring differential-privacy: one for estimating W and another for estimating
M3. We equally divided  and δ to set 1, 2 and δ1, δ2 for the two stages.
Optimal allocation of  and δ in multi-stage differentially-private algorithms is
still an open question.
Performance Variation in the MOG Setup. First, we present the perfor-
mance of the aforementioned algorithms in the setting of the mixture of Gaus-
sians. We use two synthetic data sets of different feature dimensions (D = 10,
K = 5 and D = 50, K = 10), where the common covariance is σ2 = 0.05 and
the component vectors {ak} have L2-norm at-most 1.
We first explore the privacy-utility tradeoff between  and qcomp. For the
capeAGN algorithm, the variance of the noise is inversely proportional to 2 –
smaller  means more noise (lower utility) and lower privacy risk. In the top-row
of Figure 3, we show the variation of qcomp with  for a fixed δ = 0.01 and S = 5
for two different feature dimensions, each with two different samples sizes. For
both of the feature dimensions, we observe that as  increases (higher privacy
risk), the errors decrease and the proposed capeAGN algorithm outperforms
the conv and local methods. capeAGN matches the performance of Non− priv.
method for larger  values. For a particular feature dimension, we notice that if
we increase Ns, the performance of capeAGN gets even better. This is expected
as the variance of the noise for capeAGN is inversely proportional to square of
the sample size.
Next, we consider the performance variation with Ns. Intuitively, it should
be easier to guarantee a smaller privacy risk for the same  and a higher utility
(lower error) when the number of samples is large. In the bottom row of Figure
3, we show how the errors vary as a function of Ns for the MOG model for
two different feature dimensions, while keeping δ = 0.01 and S = 5 fixed. The
variation with the sample size reinforces the results seen earlier with variation in
: the proposed capeAGN outperforms the other algorithms under investigation
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for both D = 10 and D = 50. In general, capeAGN approaches the performance
of Non− priv. as the sample size increases. When  is large enough, the capeAGN
algorithm achieves as much utility as Non− priv. method.
Finally, we show the variation of performance with the other privacy pa-
rameter δ. Recall that δ can be interpreted as the probability that the privacy-
preserving algorithm releases the private information “out in the wild” without
any additive noise. Therefore, we want to ensure that δ is small. However, the
smaller the δ is the larger the noise variance becomes. Thus smaller δ dictates
loss in utility. We observe this in our experiments as well. In the top-row of
Figure 5, we show the variation of qcomp with δ for two different feature dimen-
sions and two different sample sizes. We kept S = 5 fixed. We observe that
when  is small, we need larger δ to achieve meaningful performance. This can
be explained in the following way: for Gaussian mechanism, we need to ensure
that the standard deviation of the noise σ satisfies σ ≥ ∆
√
2 log 1.25δ , where ∆
is the L2 sensitivity of the function under consideration. This inequality can be
satisfied with infinitely many (, δ) pairs and one can keep the noise level the
same for a smaller  with a larger δ. We observe from the figure that when both
 and Ns are larger, the proposed capeAGN can achieve very close performance
to the non-private one even for very small δ values.
Performance Variation in the STM Setup. We performed experiments
on two synthetic datasets of different feature dimensions (D = 10, K = 5 and
D = 50, K = 10) generated with pre-determined w and {ak}. It should be
noted here that the recovery of {ak} is difficult [21], because the recovered word
probabilities from the tensor decomposition, whether private or non-private,
may not always be valid probability vectors (i.e., no negative entries and sum
to 1). Therefore, prior to computing the qcomp, we ran a post-processing step
(0-out negative entries and then normalize by summation) to ensure that the
recovered vectors are valid probability vectors. This process is non-linear and
potentially makes the recovery error worse. However, for practical STM, D is
not likely to be 10 or 50, rather it may be of the order of thousands, simulating
which is a huge computational burden. In general, if we want the same privacy
level for higher dimensional data, we need to increase the sample size. We refer
the reader to some efficient (but non-privacy-preserving) implementations [34]
for tensor factorization.
As in the case of the MOG model, we first explore the privacy-utility tradeoff
between  and qcomp. In the top-row of Figure 4, we show the variation of qcomp
with  for a fixed δ = 0.01 and S = 5 for two different feature dimensions. For
both of the feature dimensions, we observe that as  increases (higher privacy
risk), the errors decrease. The proposed capeAGN outperforms conv and local
methods in all settings; and match the performance of Non− priv. for large
enough . Increasing Ns makes the proposed algorithm perform even better.
Next, in the bottom-row of Figure 4, we show how the errors vary as a
function of Ns for two different feature dimensions, while keeping δ = 0.01 and
S = 5 fixed. The variation with Ns reiterates the results seen earlier. The
proposed capeAGN outperforms all other algorithms (except the Non− priv.)
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for both D = 10 and D = 50. For larger Ns, it achieves almost the same utility
as the Non− priv. algorithm. Even for smaller  with a proper sample size, the
error is very low. For the D = 10 case, the capeAGN always performs very
closely with the Non− priv. algorithm.
Lastly, we show the variation of qcomp with δ in the bottom-row of Figure
5. We observe similar performance trend as in the MOG setting. For smaller 
and sample size, we need to compensate with larger δ to achieve a performance
closer to Non− priv. one. However, when sample size is larger, we can get away
with a smaller  and δ. This is intuitive as hiding one individual among a large
group is easier – the additive noise variance need not be very large and hence
the performance does not take a large hit.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed new algorithms for distributed differentially-private
principal component analysis and orthogonal tensor decomposition. Our pro-
posed algorithms achieve the same level of additive noise variance as the pooled
data scenario for ensuring differential-privacy. Therefore, we attain the same
utility as the differentially-private pooled data scenario in a distributed setting.
This is achieved through the employment of the correlated noise design pro-
tocol, under the assumption of availability of some reasonable resources. We
empirically compared the performance of the proposed algorithms with those
of existing (if any) and conventional distributed algorithms on synthetic and
real data sets. We varied privacy parameters and relevant dataset parameters.
The proposed algorithms outperformed the existing and conventional algorithms
comfortably and matched the performance of corresponding non-private algo-
rithms for proper parameter choices. In general, the proposed algorithms offered
very good utility even for strong privacy guarantees, which indicates that mean-
ingful privacy can be attained even without loosing much utility.
Appendix
A Algebra Related with CAPE Protocol
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Let the variances of the noise terms es, fs and gs (Step 8 of Algo-
rithm 3) be given by (2). If we denote the variance of the additive noise (for
preserving privacy) in the pooled data scenario by τ2c and the variance of the
estimator aimpag (Step 10 of Algorithm 3) by τ
imp
ag
2
then Algorithm 3 achieves
τ2c = τ
imp
ag
2
.
Proof. We recall that in the pooled data scenario, the sensitivity of the function
f(x) is 1N , where x = [x1, . . . ,xS ]. Therefore, to approximate f(x) satisfying
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Algorithm 3 Correlation Assisted Private Estimation (CAPE)
Require: Data samples {xs}; privacy parameters , δ.
1: Compute τs ← 1Ns
√
2 log 1.25δ
2: At the random noise generator, generate es ∼ N (0, τ2e ), where τ2e = (1 −
1
S )τ
2
s and
∑S
s=1 es = 0
3: At the central aggregator, generate fs ∼ N (0, τ2f ), where τ2f = (1− 1S )τ2s
4: for s = 1, . . . , S do
5: Get es from the random noise generator
6: Get fs from the central aggregator
7: Generate gs ∼ N (0, τ2g ), where τ2g = τ
2
s
S
8: Compute and send aˆs ← f(xs) + es + fs + gs
9: end for
10: At the central aggregator, compute aimpag ← 1S
∑S
s=1 aˆs − 1S
∑S
s=1 fs
11: return aimpag
(, δ) differential privacy, we need to have additive Gaussian noise standard devi-
ation at least τc =
1
N
√
2 log 1.25δ . Next, consider the (, δ) differentially-private
release of the function f(xs). The sensitivity of this function is
1
Ns
. There-
fore, the (, δ) differentially-private approximate of the function f(xs) requires
an additive Gaussian noise standard deviation at least τs =
1
Ns
√
2 log 1.25δ .
Note that, if we assume equal number of samples in each site, then we have
τc =
τs
S =⇒ τ2c = τ
2
s
S2 . We will now show that the CAPE algorithm will yield
the same noise variance of the estimator at the aggregator. Recall that at the
aggregator we compute aimpag =
1
S
∑S
s=1 (aˆs − fs) = 1N
∑N
n=1 xn +
1
S
∑S
s=1 gs.
The variance of the estimator τ impag
2 , S · τ
2
g
S2 =
τ2g
S =
τ2s
S2 , which is exactly the
same as the pooled data scenario. Therefore, the CAPE algorithm allows us
to achieve the same additive noise variance as the pooled data scenario, while
satisfying at least (, δ) differential privacy at the sites and (, δ) differential
privacy for the final output from the aggregator.
A.2 Solution of the Feasibility Problem of Section 3.1
We formulated a feasibility problem to solve for the unknown noise variances
{τ2es, τ2gs, τ2fs} as
minimize 0
subject to τ2fs + τ
2
gs ≥ τ2s , τ2es + τ2gs ≥ τ2s ,
S∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
gs = τ
2
c ,
S∑
s=1
µses = 0,
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for all s ∈ [S], where {µs}, τc and τs are known to the aggregator. As mentioned
before, multiple solutions are possible. We present the details of one solution
here that solves the problem with equality.
Solution. We start with
∑S
s=1 µses = 0. We can set
S−1∑
s=1
µses + µSeS = 0 =⇒
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
es = µ
2
Sτ
2
eS
=⇒
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
es − µ2Sτ2eS = 0.
Additionally, we have
∑S−1
s=1 µ
2
sτ
2
gs + µ
2
Sτ
2
gS = τ
2
c . Combining these, we observe
τ2gS − τ2eS = 1µ2S
(
τ2c −
∑S−1
s=1 µ
2
sτ
2
s
)
. Moreover, for the S-th site, τ2gS + τ
2
eS = τ
2
S .
Therefore, we can solve for τ2gS and τ
2
eS as
τ2gS =
τ2S
2
+
1
2µ2S
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)
τ2eS =
τ2S
2
− 1
2µ2S
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)
.
Additionally, we set τ2fS from τ
2
gS + τ
2
fS = τ
2
S as
τ2fS =
τ2S
2
− 1
2µ2S
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)
.
Now, we focus on setting the noise variances for s ∈ [S − 1]. From the relation∑S−1
s=1 µ
2
sτ
2
es = µ
2
Sτ
2
eS , one solution is to set
τ2es =
1
µ2s(S − 1)
[
µ2S
2
τ2S −
1
2
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)]
.
Using this and τ2gs = τ
2
s − τ2es, we have
τ2gs = τ
2
s −
1
µ2s(S − 1)
[
µ2S
2
τ2S −
1
2
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)]
.
Finally, we solve for τ2fs = τ
2
s − τ2gs as
τ2fs =
1
µ2s(S − 1)
[
µ2S
2
τ2S −
1
2
(
τ2c −
S−1∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
s
)]
.
Therefore, we can solve the feasibility problem with equality.
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B Notation and Definitions for Tensor Data
Tensors are multi-dimensional arrays, higher dimensional analogs of matrices.
The very first tensor decomposition ideas (e.g. tensor rank and polyadic de-
composition) are attributed to Hitchcock [35, 36]. Tensor decomposition and
multi-way signal models were used in the context of latent variable models in
psychometrics [37]. It became popular in neuroscience, signal processing and
machine learning later.
An M -way or M -th order tensor is an element of the tensor product of M
vector spaces. Fibers are higher order analogs of rows and columns. A fiber
is defined by fixing every index but one. An M -way tensor X ∈ RD1×...×DM is
rank-1 if it can be written as the outer product of M vectors:
X = x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ . . .⊗ xM ,
where xm ∈ RDm and ⊗ denotes the outer product. Matricization (or un-
folding or flattening) is the process of reordering the elements of an M -way
tensor into a matrix. The mode-m matricization of X ∈ RD1×...×DM is denoted
as X(m) and is found by arranging the mode-m fibers of X as the columns of
X(m). A mode-m product is multiplying a tensor by a matrix in mode-m.
Let X ∈ RD1×...×DM and U ∈ RJ×Dm then
[X ×m U]d1...dm−1,j,dm+1...dM =
Dm∑
dm=1
[X ]d1...dM [U]j,dm .
We can also represent the mode-m flattened tensor as
Y = X ×m U⇐⇒ Y(m) = UX(m).
The vectorization of the tensor X is defined as [38,39]
vecX =
D1∑
d1=1
· · ·
DM∑
dM=1
[X ]d1,...,dM eD1d1 ◦ · · · ◦ eDMdM ,
where ◦ denotes the Kronecker product [4] and eDm denotes the Dm-dimensional
elementary (or unit basis) vector. We note that vecX is a (∏Mm=1Dm)-dimensional
vector. A tensor is called symmetric if the entries do not change under any
permutation of the indices. The rank of a tensor X is the smallest number
of rank-1 tensors that sums to the original tensor [11]. The norm of a tensor
X ∈ RD1×...×DM [3] is
‖X‖ =
√√√√ D1∑
d1=1
· · ·
DM∑
dM=1
[X ]2d1,...,dM .
This is equivalent to the matrix Frobenius norm. We note that the norm ‖X‖ of
a tensor X is equal to the L2-norm of the vectorized version of the same tensor,
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vecX . That is, ‖X‖ = ‖vecX‖2. We also observe that for a vector x ∈ RD, if
the L2-norm ‖x‖2 = 1 then
‖x⊗ · · · ⊗ x‖ = 1 because
[x⊗ · · · ⊗ x]d1,...,dM = [x]d1 · · · [x]dM .
The operator norm of an M -way symmetric tensor X ∈ RD×...×D is defined [3]
as
‖X‖op = sup
‖x‖2=1
|X (x,x, . . . ,x)| .
Finally, a tensor X ∈ RD1×...×DM can be considered to be a multi-linear map [3]
in the following sense: for a set of matrices {Vm ∈ RDm×Km : m = 1, 2, . . . ,M},
the (k1, k2, . . . , kM )-th entry in theM -way tensor representation of Z = X (V1, . . . ,VM ) ∈
RK1×...×KM is
[Z]k1...kM =
∑
d1...dM
[X ]d1...dM [V]d1,k1 · · · [V]dM ,kM .
Therefore, we have
X (V1 . . .VM ) = X ×1 V>1 · · · ×M V>M .
C Algebra for Various Calculations
C.1 Calculation of Aˆ in Section 4
We show the calculation of Aˆ here in detail. Recall that the sites send their Aˆs
to the aggregator and the aggregator computes
Aˆ =
1
S
S∑
s=1
(
Aˆs − Fs
)
=
1
S
S∑
s=1
(As + Es + Fs + Gs − Fs)
=
1
S
S∑
s=1
(As + Gs) +
1
S
S∑
s=1
Es
=
1
S
S∑
s=1
(As + Gs) ,
where we used the relation
∑S
s=1 Es = 0.
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C.2 Calculation of M˜3 in Section 5
We show the calculation of M˜3 here in detail. We recall that
M˜s3 = Mˆs3 (W,W,W) .
Additionally, at the aggregator, we compute
M˜3 = 1
S
S∑
s=1
(
M˜s3 − F˜s3
)
,
where F˜s3 = Fs3 (W,W,W). Then we have
M˜3 = 1
S
S∑
s=1
(
Ms3 (W,W,W) + Es3 (W,W,W) +
F˜s3 + Gs3 (W,W,W)− F˜s3
)
=
1
S
S∑
s=1
(
Ms3
(
W,W,W
)
+ Gs3 (W,W,W)
)
+(
1
S
S∑
s=1
Es3
)
(W,W,W)
=
1
S
S∑
s=1
(Ms3 (W,W,W) + Gs3 (W,W,W))
=
(
1
S
S∑
s=1
Ms3 + Gs3
)
(W,W,W) ,
where we used the associativity of the multi-linear operation [3] and the relation∑S
s=1 Es3 = 0.
D Applications of Orthogonal Tensor Decompo-
sition
We review two examples from Anandkumar et al. [3], which involve estimation
of latent variables from observed samples. The lower-order moments obtained
from the samples can be written as low-rank symmetric tensors.
D.1 Single Topic Model (STM)
Let us consider an exchangeable bag-of-words model [3] for documents. Such
exchangeable models can be viewed as mixture models in which there is a latent
variable h such that the L words in the document t1, t2, . . . , tL are conditionally
i.i.d. given h. Additionally, the conditional distributions are identical at all the
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nodes [3]. Let us assume that h is the only topic of a given document, and
it can take only K distinct values. Let D be the number of distinct words in
the vocabulary, and L ≥ 3 be the number of words in each document. The
generative process for a document is as follows: the document’s topic is drawn
according to the discrete distribution specified by the probability vector w =
[w1, w2, . . . , wK ]
>
. This is modeled as a discrete random variable h such that
Pr [h = k] = wk,
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Given the topic h, the document’s L words are drawn
independently according to the discrete distribution specified by the probability
vector ah ∈ RD. We represent the L words in the document by D-dimensional
random vectors tl ∈ RD. Specifically, if the l-th word is d, we set
tl = ed for l = 1, 2, . . . , L,
where e1, e2, . . . , eD are the standard coordinate basis vectors for RD. We
observe that for any topic k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
E [t1 ⊗ t2|h = k] =
∑
i,j
Pr [t1 = i, t2 = j|h = k] ei ⊗ ej
= E [t1|h = k]⊗ E [t2|h = k]
= ak ⊗ ak.
Now, we can define two moments in terms of the outer products of the proba-
bility vectors ak and the distribution of the topics h
M2 =
K∑
k=1
wkak ⊗ ak, (6)
M3 =
K∑
k=1
wkak ⊗ ak ⊗ ak. (7)
The method proposed in [3] to recover w and {ak} proceeds as follows: we
observe N documents. Each of the documents has number of words L ≥ 3.
The way we record what we observe is: we form an D × D × D tensor whose
(d1, d2, d3)-th entry is the proportion of times we see a document with first
word d1, second word d2 and third word d3. In this setting, we can estimate
the moments M2 and M3, defined in (6), from the observed data as:
M2 = E[t1 ⊗ t2], (8)
M3 = E[t1 ⊗ t2 ⊗ t3]. (9)
We then need to perform orthogonal tensor decomposition onM3 to recover w
and {ak}.
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D.2 Mixture of Gaussians (MOG)
A similar example as the single topic model is the spherical mixture of Gaus-
sians [3]. Let us assume that there are K components and the component mean
vectors are given by the set {a1,a2, . . . ,aK} ⊂ RD. The probability of choosing
component k is wk. We assume that the common covariance matrix is σ
2ID.
However, the model can be extended to incorporate different covariance matri-
ces for different component as well [3,9]. The n-th observation of the model can
be written as
tn = ah + z,
where h is a discrete random variable with Pr[h = k] = wk and z is an D-
dimensional random vector, independent from h, drawn according toN (0, σ2ID).
Let us denote the total number of observations by N . Without loss of generality,
we assume that ‖ak‖2 ≤ 1. Now, for D ≥ K, it has been shown [9] that if we
have estimates of the second and third order moments from the observations tn
as M2 = E[t⊗ t]− σ2ID and
M3 = E[t⊗ t⊗ t]−
σ2
D∑
d=1
(E[t]⊗ ed ⊗ ed + ed ⊗ E[t]⊗ ed + ed ⊗ ed ⊗ E[t]) ,
then these moments are decomposable as
M2 =
K∑
k=1
wkak ⊗ ak,M3 =
K∑
k=1
wkak ⊗ ak ⊗ ak.
D.3 Orthogonal Decomposition of M3
For both the STM and the MOG model, in order to decompose M3 using the
tensor power method (3), we need the ak’s to be orthogonal to each other. But,
in general, they are not. To employ the orthogonal tensor decomposition, we
can project the tensor onto some subspace W ∈ RD×K to ensure W>ak’s are
orthogonal to each other. We note that, according to the multi-linear notation,
we have
M3(V1,V2,V3) =
K∑
k=1
wk
(
V>1 ak
)⊗ (V>2 ak)⊗ (V>3 ak) . (10)
In order to find W, we can compute the SVD(K) on the second-order moment
M2 ∈ RD×D as
M2 = UDU
>,
where U ∈ RD×K and D ∈ RK×K . We define W = UD− 12 ∈ RD×K and then
compute the projection M˜3 =M3(W,W,W). We note that M˜3 ∈ RK×K×K
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is now orthogonally decomposable. We use the tensor power iteration (3) on
M˜3 to recover the weights {wk} and the component vectors {ak}. The detail
of the tensor power method can be found in Anandkumar et al. [3].
E Differentially-private OTD
We note that the key step in the orthogonal tensor decomposition algorithm
is the mapping given by (3). In order to ensure differential privacy for the
orthogonal decomposition, we may either add noise at each iteration step scaled
to the L2 sensitivity [26] of the operation given by (3) or we can add noise to the
tensor X itself just once. Adding noise in each iteration step might result in a
poor utility/accuracy of the recovered eigenvectors and eigenvalues. We intend
to add noise to the tensor itself prior to employing the tensor power method.
In the following, we are showing the sensitivity calculations for the pooled data
scenario. Extension to the distributed case is straightforward (replacing N with
Ns).
First, we focus on the exchangeable single topic model setup that we de-
scribed in Appendix D.1. We observe and record N documents. Let us consider
two sets of documents, which differ in only one sample (e.g., the last one). Let
the empirical second-order moment matrices be M2 and M
′
2 and the third-order
moment tensors be M3 and M′3, respectively, for these two sets. We consider
the two tensors, M3 and M′3, as neighboring. We observe that
M2 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
t1,nt
>
2,n
=
1
N
N−1∑
n=1
t1,nt
>
2,n +
1
N
t1,Nt
>
2,N ,
M′2 =
1
N
N−1∑
n=1
t1,nt
>
2,n +
1
N
t′1,Nt
′>
2,N ,
where tl,n denotes the l-th word of the n-th document. Similarly, we observe
M3 = 1
N
D∑
d=1
t1,n ⊗ t2,n ⊗ t3,n
=
1
N
N−1∑
n=1
t1,n ⊗ t2,n ⊗ t3,n + 1
N
t1,N ⊗ t2,N ⊗ t3,N ,
M′3 = 1
N
N−1∑
n=1
t1,n ⊗ t2,n ⊗ t3,n + 1
N
t′1,N ⊗ t′2,N ⊗ t′3,N .
As mentioned before, we perform the SVD on M2 first to compute W. We
intend to use the AG algorithm [26] to make this operation differentially private.
30
We look at the following quantity:
‖M2 −M′2‖2 = 1
N
‖t1,Nt>2,N − t′1,Nt′>2,N‖2
=
1
N
sup
‖u‖2,‖v‖2=1
{
u>
(
t1,Nt
>
2,N − t′1,Nt′>2,N
)
v
}
≤
√
2
N
= ∆2,S ,
because of the encoding tl,n = ed. For the mixture of Gaussians model, we
note that we assumed ‖ak‖2 ≤ 1 for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. To find a bound
on ‖M2 −M′2‖2, we consider the following: for identifiability of the {ak}, we
have to assume that the ak’s are linearly independent. In other words, we are
interested in finding the directions of the components specified by {ak}. In that
sense, while obtaining the samples, we can divide the samples by a constant ζ
such that ‖tn‖2 ≤ 1 is satisfied. From the resulting second- and third-order
moments, we will be able to recover {ak} up to a scale factor. It is easy to show
using the definition of largest eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix [40] that
‖M2 −M′2‖2 = 1
N
sup
‖u‖2=1
{
u>
(
tNt
>
N − t′Nt′>N
)
u
}
=
1
N
sup
‖u‖2=1
{ ∣∣u>tN ∣∣2 − ∣∣u>t′N ∣∣2 }
≤ 1
N
= ∆2,M ,
where the inequality follows from the relation ‖tn‖2 ≤ 1. We note that the
largest singular value of a matrix is the square root of the largest eigenvalue
of that matrix. For the distributed case, as mentioned before, the sensitivity
of Ms2 depends only on the local sample size. We can therefore use the AG
algorithm [26] (i.e., adding Gaussian noise with variance scaled to ∆2,S or ∆2,S
to M2) to make the computation of W (1, δ1)-differentially private.
Now, we focus on the tensorM3. We need to projectM3 on W before using
the tensor power method. We can choose between making the projection oper-
ation differentially private, or we can make the M3 itself differentially private
before projection. We found that making the projection operation differentially
private involves addition of a large amount of noise and more importantly, the
variance of the noise to be added depends on the alphabet size (or feature di-
mension) D and the singular values of M2. Therefore, we choose to make the
tensor itself differentially private. We are interested to find the sensitivity of the
tensor valued function f(M3) = M3, which is simply the identity map. That
is, we need to find the maximum quantity that this function can change if we
replace the argumentM3 with a neighboringM′3. For our exchangeable single
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topic model setup, we have
‖M3 −M′3‖ =
∥∥∥ 1
N
t1,N ⊗ t2,N ⊗ t3,N − 1
N
t′1,N ⊗ t′2,N ⊗ t′3,N
∥∥∥
≤
√
2
N
= ∆3,S ,
because only one entry in the D×D×D tensor t1,N⊗t2,N⊗t3,N is non-zero (in
fact, the only non-zero entry is 1). Now, for the mixture of Gaussians model,
we define
T = σ2
D∑
d=1
(E[t]⊗ ed ⊗ ed + ed ⊗ E[t]⊗ ed + ed ⊗ ed ⊗ E[t])
Therefore, we have
T − T ′ = σ
2
N
D∑
d=1
(
(tN − t′N )⊗ ed ⊗ ed+
ed ⊗ (tN − t′N )⊗ ed + ed ⊗ ed ⊗ (tN − t′N )
)
‖T − T ′‖ ≤ 3Dσ
2
N
‖tN − t′N‖2
≤ 6Dσ
2
N
,
where the last inequality follows from ‖tn‖2 ≤ 1. Now, we have
‖M3 −M′3‖ =
∥∥∥ 1
N
tN ⊗ tN ⊗ tN−
1
N
t′N ⊗ t′N ⊗ t′N + T − T ′
∥∥∥
≤ 2
N
+
6Dσ2
N
= ∆3,M ,
because ‖tN⊗tN⊗tN‖ = 1 in our setup. Again, we note that in the distributed
setting, the sensitivity of the localMs3 depends only on the local sample size. In
the following, we present the two recently proposed algorithms from Imtiaz and
Sarwate [21]. The first one uses a symmetric tensor made with i.i.d. entries from
a Gaussian distribution, while the second proposed method uses a symmetric
tensor made with entries taken from a sample vector drawn from an appropriate
distribution. Both of the algorithms guarantee (, δ)-differential privacy.
E.1 Addition of i.i.d. Gaussian Noise
The AGN algorithm first uses the AG algorithm [26] to compute a differentially-
private estimate of the second-order moment matrix M2. We note that the
L2 sensitivity of M2 is given by ∆2,S and ∆2,M in Appendix E for the STM
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Algorithm 4 AGN Algorithm
Require: Sample second-order moment matrix M2 ∈ RD×D and third-order
moment tensor M3 ∈ RD×D×D, privacy parameters 1, 2, δ1, δ2.
1: Generate D×D symmetric matrix E with {Eij : i ∈ [D], j ≤ i} drawn i.i.d.
from N (0, τ21 ) and Eij = Eji. Here, τ1 = ∆21
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ1
)
2: Mˆ2 ←M2 + E
3: Compute SVD(K) on Mˆ2 = UDU
> and find W = UD−
1
2
4: Draw a sample vector b ∈ RDsym whose entries are i.i.d ∼ N (0, τ22 ), where
Dsym =
(
D+2
3
)
and τ = ∆32
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ2
)
5: Generate a symmetric tensor E ∈ RD×D×D from the entries of b
6: Compute Mˆ3 ←M3 + E
7: Compute M˜3 ← Mˆ3(W,W,W)
8: return The differentially private orthogonally decomposable tensor M˜3,
projection subspace W
and MOG models, respectively. Therefore, we generate a D × D symmetric
matrix E whose upper triangle and diagonal entries are sampled i.i.d. from
N (0, τ21 ) and lower triangle entries are copied from upper triangle. Here, τ1 =
∆2,S
1
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ1
)
for the STM and τ1 =
∆2,M
1
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ1
)
for the MOG
model. By computing the SVD(K) on the (1, δ1)-differentially private esti-
mate of M2 (denoted Mˆ2), we find the subspace W required for whitening
and also for recovering the component vectors {ak}. Next, we draw a Dsym-
dimensional vector b with i.i.d. entries from N (0, τ22 ), where Dsym =
(
D+2
3
)
and
τ2 =
∆3,S
2
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ2
)
for the STM and τ2 =
∆3,M
2
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ2
)
for the MOG
model. In order to preserve the symmetry of the third-order tensor M3 upon
noise addition, we form a symmetric tensor E ∈ RD×D×D from the entries of
b. This noise tensor is then added to M3 to achieve Mˆ3, which is the (2, δ2)-
differentially private estimate of M3. Finally, we project Mˆ3 on the subspace
W to get the orthogonally decomposable tensor M˜3. The detailed procedure is
depicted in Algorithm 4.
Theorem 3 (Privacy of AGN Algorithm). Algorithm 4 computes an (1+2, δ1+
δ2)-differentially private orthogonally decomposable tensor M˜3.
Proof. From the Gaussian mechanism [1,26], we know that if the L2 sensitivity
of a vector valued function f is denoted by ∆f , then adding independently
drawn random noise distributed as N (0, τ2) ensures (, δ)-differential privacy,
where
τ =
∆f

√
2 log
(
1.25
δ
)
.
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Algorithm 5 AVN Algorithm
Require: Sample second-order moment matrix M2 ∈ RD×D and third-order
moment tensor M3 ∈ RD×D×D, privacy parameters 1, 2, δ1, δ2.
1: Generate D×D symmetric matrix E with {Eij : i ∈ [D], j ≤ i} drawn i.i.d.
from N (0, τ21 ) and Eij = Eji. Here, τ1 = ∆21
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ1+δ2
)
2: Mˆ2 ←M2 + E
3: Compute SVD(K) on Mˆ2 = UDU
> and find W = UD−
1
2
4: Draw a sample vector b ∈ RDsym from the density given by (12), where
Dsym =
(
D+2
3
)
and β = 2∆3
5: Generate a symmetric tensor E ∈ RD×D×D from the entries of b
6: Compute Mˆ3 ←M3 + E
7: Compute M˜3 ← Mˆ3(W,W,W)
8: return The differentially private orthogonally decomposable tensor M˜3,
projection subspace W
Now, in order to make the function f(M3) = M3 differentially private, we
need to find the L2 sensitivity of f(M3). We computed the sensitivity of this
function in Appendix E. That is
‖M3 −M′3‖ ≤ ∆3,S for STM, and
‖M3 −M′3‖ ≤ ∆3,M for MOG.
We need to generate a symmetric tensor of the same dimension as M3 with
i.i.d. entries from the distribution N (0, τ2), where ∆f = ∆3,S (or ∆3,M ) and
(, δ) = (2, δ2). We note that a D-dimensional M -mode symmetric tensor is
fully determined by
Dsym =
(
D +M − 1
M
)
(11)
elements [28]. The computation of Mˆ3 is (2, δ2)-differentially private. We
project Mˆ3 onto the subspace W to get the orthogonally decomposable tensor
M˜3. We recall that we compute W from Mˆ2, which is the (1, δ1) differentially
private approximate to M2. The computation of M˜3 for recovering the weights
{wk} and {ak} is therefore (1 + 2, δ1 + δ2)-differentially private. The overall
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4. The above method can be considered as a
tensor-analogue of the Analyze Gauss method for symmetric matrices [26].
E.2 Addition of Vector Noise
The AVN algorithm first uses the AG algorithm [26] to compute a (1, δ) differentially-
private estimate of the second-order moment matrix M2 and then computes the
subspace W required for whitening and also for recovering the component vec-
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tors of M3. Next, we draw a Dsym-dimensional vector b from the density [41]:
fb(b) =
1
α
exp (−β‖b‖2) , (12)
where α is a normalizing constant and β is a parameter of the density. Later we
will choose appropriate values for β to ensure desired privacy levels. In order
to preserve the symmetry of the third-order tensorM3 upon noise addition, we
form a symmetric tensor E ∈ RD×D×D from the entries of b. This noise tensor
is then added to M3 to achieve Mˆ3. Finally, we project Mˆ3 on the subspace
W to get the orthogonally decomposable tensor M˜3. The detailed procedure is
shown in Algorithm 5.
Theorem 4 (Privacy of AVN Algorithm). Algorithm 5 computes an (1 +2, δ)-
differentially private orthogonally decomposable tensor M˜3.
Proof. In order to make the function f(M3) = M3 differentially private, we
consider the algorithm
Y =M3 + E ,
where E is a symmetric tensor of the same dimension as M3. We note that E
consists Dsym =
(
D+2
3
)
number of unique entries. We propose to draw a vector
b ∈ RDsym according to the density in (12) and then form a symmetric tensor
E from the entries of b. The probability of the event of drawing a particular
sample from (12) is the same as drawing a symmetric tensor with the same
unique entries as the aforementioned vector from some equivalent density on
symmetric tensors. Now, we are interested in the ratio of the density of Y
under M3 and the density of Y under M′3
f(Y|M3)
f(Y|M′3) =
fb(Y −M3)
fb(Y −M3)
=
exp (−β‖vecY − vecM3‖2)
exp (−β‖vecY − vecM′3‖2)
≤ exp (β‖vecM′3 − vecM3‖2)
≤ exp (β‖M′3 −M3‖)
≤ exp (β∆3) ,
where the inequality is introduced following from the triangle inequality of
norms. Therefore, we observe that if we set β = 2∆3 , the algorithm Y =M3 +E
becomes (2, 0)-differentially private. We set β =
2
∆3,S
for the STM and β =
2
∆3,M
for the MOG. We project the output of the algorithm onto W to obtain
M˜3. The full algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5 and is (1 + 2, δ)-differentially
private.
We note here that we do not need to specify the normalizing constant α in
(12). This is because sampling from this distribution can be performed without
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any knowledge of α. What we do to sample from the density (12) is the following:
we have to sample a radius and a direction. The direction we can pick uniformly
by sampling Dsym-dimensional standard Gaussian vector with i.i.d. entries and
normalizing it. The radius is Erlang distributed with parameters (Dsym, β).
We can generate this by taking the sum of Dsym exponential variables with
parameter β. Note that the AGN and AVN algorithms essentially differ in one
step – the density from which the noise vector b is drawn from. However, the
implications are further-reaching. With AVN, the computation of Mˆ3 is pure
2-DP. Therefore, if one uses an 1-DP algorithm for Step 3 in Algorithm 5, or
if the tensor is already orthogonally decomposable (i.e., no need for whitening),
then the AVN algorithm would provide a pure -DP algorithm for OTD.
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